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ARE PROPERTY INTERESTS HELD BY LAND CONTRACT
PURCHASERS “LIKE-KIND” TO A FEE?
— by Neil E. Harl*
Without much doubt, like-kind exchanges have become a popular way to dispose of
interests in land and other assets.1  With substantial use of installment sale
transactions in the disposition of farmland,2 some like-kind exchanges involve the
rights of purchasers under installment land contracts.  The question is whether a land
contract purchaser’s interest in land is “like-kind”3 with a fee simple interest in land.
“Like-kind” in the case of real estate
The rules as to what is “like-kind” have been less rigid in the case of real estate than
with depreciable personal property.4  Thus, IRS has approved, as like-kind, a sale
followed by a lease-back involving terms of 30 years or more,5 an exchange of a
remainder interest in farmland for a remainder interest in other farmland,6 an
exchange of a remainder interest for a fee simple interest in real property,7 an
exchange of a conservation easement in perpetuity for a fee simple interest in other
farmland,8 an exchange of “mitigation credits” involving wetlands,9 and  exchange
of a fee simple interest in realty for a leasehold interest of at least 30 years to run.10
Starker v. United States
With respect to an exchange of a land contract purchaser’s interest in realty for a fee
simple interest, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Starker v. United States11
indicated that such an exchange was like-kind.  In the facts of the portion of that case
which is relevant here, one party to the exchange held purchaser’s rights under a sales
agreement for a tract of land.  One of the original transferors held a life estate in the
property and legal title would not pass until the expiration of that life estate.12 In the
meantime, the contract purchasers were entitled to possession but were subject to
various restrictions including a prohibition on removing improvements, a requirement
that buildings and fences be maintained in good repair and a commitment that a
substantial part of the purchase price had to be invested with a fixed return paid to the
purchaser of the life interest (one of the sellers under the land contract).13 If any of
these conditions failed, the sellers could elect to void the contract.14
The court said despite these contingencies, the contract purchaser held what was
“the equivalent of a fee interest for purposes of determining whether the properties
exchanged are of a like-kind.”15  Under the terms of the deal, the contract purchaser
“had at least the rights of a long-term lessee, plus an equitable fee subject to
conditions precedent.”16 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
purchaser’s rights under the facts of that case were equivalent to a fee simple interest
for like-kind exchange purposes.17
The obvious question is whether the unique conditions present in Starker v. United
____________________________________________________________________________
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States18 weaken the case as precedent for a situation
involving a straightforward land contract purchase.
Arguably, the latter would pose even less of a doubt as to
whether the interest was “like-kind” with a fee simple
interest.  Conceivably, the interest in Starker19 could be
stretched over a period of some years, until the expiration of
the life estate.  In the usual land contract transaction, the
purchaser acquires an equitable interest in the real estate with
a known period to conveyance of formal title.  It is true that a
land contract purchaser’s interest could be forfeited for non-
performance under the contract but that feature presumably
was present in Starker v. United States.20
Although Congress addressed another feature of the Starker
holding, namely the fact that the exchange did not have to be
contemporaneous, indeed that the court approved a
substantial delay in the acquisition of replacement property,21
Congress did not address the matter of whether a land
contract purchaser’s interest qualifies as “like-kind” to a fee
simple interest.  Presumably, the Congress was not greatly
concerned about that feature of the case although there is no
direct evidence in support of that conclusion.  Nonetheless,
the exchange of a contract purchaser’s interest in land for a
fee simple interest appears to be like-kind.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 27.03[8][a][ii]
(2000); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[16] (2000).
See also Harl, “What Is ‘Like-Kind’?”; 9 Agr. L. Dig. 149
(1998).
2 See Pieper & Harl, Iowa Farmland Ownership and Tenure
1982-1997:  A Fifteen-Year Perspective, Iowa Agriculture
and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State
University, January, 2000, p. 13 (9.5 percent of land
acquired under installment land contracts in 1997).
3 See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).
4 See Harl, “What Is ‘Like-Kind’?” 9 Agr. L. Dig. 149
(1998).
5 Rev. Rul. 60-43, 1960-1 C.B. 687.
6 Rev. Rul. 78-4, 1978-1 C.B. 256.
7 Ltr. Rul. 9143053, July 30, 1991.
8 Ltr. Rul. 9601046, Oct. 10, 1995 (perpetual conservation
easement to Department of Interior).
9 Ltr. Rul. 9612009, Dec. 18, 1995.
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c).  See Rev. Rul. 78-72, 1978-1
C.B. 258 (unexpired term of lease includes renewal option
p ri ds).
11 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
12 Id.
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14 Id.
15 Id.
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19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (establishing time limits on
identifying replacement property and in receiving the
replacement property).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS .
FALSE SCHEDULES. The debtor made several false
lists of estate property and exempt property on the
bankruptcy schedules throughout the Chapter 7 case,
including omission of property and transfer of property
through the debtor’s business. The debtor had been denied a
discharge because of the false schedules. The court held
that the schedules became so unreliable that the debtor
would also be denied all exemption claims. In re Park, 246
B.R. 837 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000).
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CONVERSION. The debtors operated a fish farm and
filed for Chapter 12. One debtor was the heir of a parent
who died shortly before the Chapter 12 petition. The debtor
disclaimed any interest in the estate one day before filing
the petition, resulting in the inheritance passing to the
debtor’s children. The debtors failed to include several
items of property on the bankruptcy schedules and had not
filed amended schedules by the time of this decision. The
court held that the Chapter 12 case was to be converted to
Chapter 7 because the debtors attempted to defraud the
creditors by concealing assets. The court chose conversion
instead of dismissal because the debtors had made several
preferential transfers which the Chapter 7 trustee could
recover for the benefit of creditors. In re Kloubec, 247
B.R. 246 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor had filed a previous Chapter
13 case and the issue was whether the previous case tolled
the three year period for purposes of Section
507(a)(8)(A)(i) and whether the tolled period included the
six month provision in I.R.C. § 6503(h)(2). The court held
that the length  of the previous bankruptcy case plus six
mo ths was to be added to the three year period of Section
507(a)(8)(A)(i) to determine which taxes were
dischargeable. In re Schultz, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,510 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2000).
